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The nature of consciousness and the autonomy of the individual’s mind have been a focus
of interest throughout the past century and inspired many theories and models. Revival of
studies on psychological trauma and dissociation, which remained outside mainstream
psychiatry, psychology, and psychoanalysis for the most part of the past century, has
provided a new opportunity to revisit this intellectual and scientific endeavor. This paper
attempts to integrate a series of empirical and theoretical studies on psychological
consequences of developmental traumatization, which may yield further insight into
factors which threaten the integrity of human consciousness. The paper proposes that
an individual’s experience of distorted reality and betrayal precipitates a cyclical dynamic
between the individual and the external world by disrupting the developmental function
of mutuality which is essential for maintenance of the integrity of the internal world while
this inner world is in turn regulated vis-à-vis external reality. Dissociation -the common
factor in all types of post-traumatic syndromes- is facilitated by violation of boundaries by
relational omission and intrusion as represented by distinct effects and consequences of
childhood neglect and abuse. Recent research conducted on clinical and non-clinical
populations shows both bimodal (undermodulation and overmodulation) and bipolar
(intrusion and avoidance) neurobiological and phenomenological characteristics of
post-traumatic response. These seem to reflect “parallel-distinct structures” that
control separate networks covering sensori-motor and cognitive-emotional systems.
This understanding provides a conceptual framework to assist explanation of diverse
post-traumatic mental trajectories which culminate in a common final pathway comprised
of partly overlapping clinical syndromes such as complex PTSD, dissociative depression,
dissociative identity disorder (DID), or “borderline” phenomena. Of crucial theoretical and
clinical importance is that these maladaptive post-traumatic psychological formations are
regarded as processes in their own right rather than as a personality disorder innate to
the individual. Such mental division may perform in that internal detachment can serve
to preserve the genuine aspects of the subject until such time as they can be reclaimed
via psychotherapy. The paper attempts to integrate these ideas with reference to the
previously proposed theory of the “Functional Dissociation of Self” (S¸ar and Öztürk,
2007).
Keywords: childhood abuse, childhood neglect, borderline personality, dissociation, somatic symptoms,
psychological dissociation, identity integration, psychotherapy
S¸ar Parallel-Distinct Structures and Self-identity
As a relational being, individual and his/her psychological
survival is very much affected by the social environment which
may be less than optimal for adjustment. Hence, the integrity
of human consciousness and the autonomy of the individual’s
mind are densely interwoven with psychological trauma and
its consequences. Psychological trauma refers to psychological
injury, wound, and pain. The present paper proposes that
analogous to the physical response to overwhelming threat
to homeostasis, the psychological response to traumatic stress
comprises protection of vital parts of the psychobiological system,
even at the cost of other parts, until the threat is over. Thus
psychosocial adjustment, in developmental periods of life in
particular, may constitute arrest or delay in realization of one’s
unique and authentic potentials which necessarily leads to a
division of mind. The consequence is disavowal of or inability
to develop one’s integrated self-identity with the possibility to
subsequently re-claim it under favorable conditions.
Healing of the psychologically wounded individual is based
on the congruent sequence of discourse, theory, model, technique,
and application, where none of these can replace any of the
others. Hence this paper begins with theoretical assumptions
before addressing empirical material in the later sections. Several
hypotheses are revived in the context of chronic developmental
trauma, the very trajectory which constitutes a threat to
psychological survival of the individual.
TRAUMA AND “SPLIT-MIND”:
FUNCTIONAL DISSOCIATION OF SELF
In an inquiry into the interface between individual and society,
S¸ar andÖztürk (2007, 2013) proposed the concept of the personal
“Sociological Self ” as part of a theory which addresses both
non-clinical and post-traumatic conditions. According to their
theory of “Functional Dissociation of Self,” expansion of the
individual’s sociological self due to developmental traumatization
(e.g., childhood neglect or abuse) and additional factors (e.g.,
overadjustment to social demands of benign or malevolent
types) leads to a detachment in the individual’s internal
world. This theory claims that this division has a protective
aim; i.e., individual’s “sociological self ” is devoted to save
his/her “psychological self ” from annihilation (where the latter
represents the unique and authentic aspects of the individual).
In his famous study “Sickness Unto Death” (published in
1849), Danish philosopher Kierkegaard (1849/1983) assumed
that the human existence was based on relation (although not
necessarily an interpersonal one): “A human being is a spirit.
But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The
self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation
relating itself to itself in the relation” (Marino, 2009). To augment
Kierkegaard’s statement, one could better say that, an “integrated
self ” is nothing else than the harmonical relation between the
“sociological self ” and “psychological self ” of the individual as
proposed and conceptualized by S¸ar and Öztürk (2007, 2013).
After detaching from sociological self, the “psychological self,”
however, becomes frozen and lacks the resources for further
development. In addition to the detached “sociological” and
“psychological” selves, the “trauma-self ” S¸ar and Öztürk (2005,
2007) emerges and remains in a perpetual status of help-seeking.
In fact, this is the “symptomatic” self (Öztürk and S¸ar, 2016a)
which may be explicit in daily life.
Self and/or identity disturbance, emptiness, and fear of
abandonment seem to reflect such conditions (Meares et al.,
2011). The central state is “painful incoherence” as observed
in a “dissociative depression” (S¸ar, 2011a). Alternatively, while
describing loss of connection to the “psychological self,” the
Turcic poet Yassawi (1093–1166) stated: “I can not get news
from myself.” Similar testimonies also feature in the text Feeling
Unreal: Depersonalization Disorder and the Loss of the Self
(Simeon and Abugel, 2006).
In fact, the idea of “split mind” and potential co-existence
of healthy and pathological parts is not new as Bleuler’s (1911)
concepts of “schizophrenia” and “double book-keeping” and
Winnicott (1965) conception of the “false self ” reveal. The
Theory of Functional Dissociation of Self (S¸ar and Öztürk,
2007) is contrasting however in not regarding such division
as necessarily pathological or maladaptive; i.e., a harmonical
relationship between sociological and psychological selves is
possible and, even, healthy. Hence such dual development may
also have normative (“non-traumatic”) aspects. Description of
the optimal trajectories of both selves throughout each phase of
life remains an important task which exceeds the aims and limits
of the present paper.
COMPLEX TRAUMA AND PSYCHIATRIC
CONSEQUENCES: PERSONALITY OR
DISORDER?
Cumulative relational traumatization in the early years of
life has been differentiated from acute stressful events as
“complex trauma” (Herman, 1992; Van der Kolk, 1996; Courtois,
2004). Research shows that chronic relational traumas (e.g.,
childhood abuse and neglect) are as damaging to mental
health and relationship outcomes as the non-relational and
acute ones (Anders et al., 2012). Various types of complex
clinical constellations may emerge in the aftermath of relational
trauma such as complex posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
dissociative depression, dissociative identity disorder (DID), and
“borderline” phenomena (S¸ar, 2011b, 2014, 2016).
Due to their pervasive and enduring character, these
syndromes were for most of the twentieth century considered
by mainstream psychiatry, psychology, and psychoanalysis as
disturbances of personality. Unlike earlier theories which
assumed a strong relationship between personality and
maladaptation (Kernberg, 1987), I propose a clear demarcation
between unique aspects of the individual and trauma-related
psychological process which “intrudes” and/or “possesses” the
subject’s “internal world.” Nor is this merely a point of scientific
curiosity; I further contend that development of a clear vision
about this demarcation line by the traumatized individual is
necessary in treatment. The associated “damage” is principally
reversible in conditions where “repair” (i.e., appropriate
treatment) is available.
To consider this theoretical stance, and to inquire into various
aspects of such trauma-generated mental division of this kind,
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the paper reviews findings from a limited series of hypothesis-
generating empirical studies which gathered data on lifelong
consequences of childhood trauma in various clinical and non-
clinical populations. I hypothesize that chronic developmental
traumatization leads to a functional re-organization of the mind
into enduring “parallel-distinct structures” which operate side
by side without being fully integrated with each other in aim,
content, and process. Such re-organization serves in buffering
the traumatic breach in and between external reality and internal
world. Although devoted to protection of the individual’s unique
psychological aspects (i.e., rather than constituting a mere
fragmentation in the face of relational trauma), such division of
the internal world may undermine the enduring experience of a
coherent self-identity. It may also lead to crisis-proneness due to
loss of mutuality between “parallel-distinct structures.”
STIMULUS MODULATION AND TRAUMA:
BROKEN BOUNDARIES AND LOSS OF
INTEGRATION
Due to his professional background in physiology, Freud
(1920/1975) assumed that the central nervous system was
protected by a “shield” (“Reizschutz”) in the sense of a stimulus
barrier defending from excessive stimulation. In traumatic
conditions, the barrier is suddenly and violently breached,
overwhelming the nervous system with an influx of stimuli it
cannot handle. Recent neurobiological research has documented
the fact that traumatic stimuli trigger two types of reaction
(Lanius et al., 2010). One is primarily avoidant, and constitutes
emotional overmodulation based on excessive corticolimbic
inhibition. This can lead to subjective disengagement from
content of the traumatic memory. The other is predominantly
intrusive, and a hyperaroused type of response which comprises
undermodulation of emotions whichmay lead to re-experiencing
the traumatic event in the “internal world.”
Stimulus modulation is an idea with diverse repercussions.
From a physiological perspective, chronic overstimulation may
lead to habituation or exhaustion. In contrast, denervation and
other forms of stimulus deprivation cause an increase in the
magnitude of subsequent responses (a phenomenon commonly
referred to as denervation supersensitivity).
From a psychological perspective, stimulus deprivation may
weaken the individual’s orientation to reality because the person
is not buffered against the predominance of “internal stimuli.”
Disproportionate stimulation interferes with the mental capacity
to develop links between thoughts, emotions, and behaviors; i.e.,
it provokes dissociation (S¸ar and Öztürk, 2013). Hence, stimulus
modulation is essential for maintaining homeostasis and healthy
adaptation; i.e., keeping the “integrative mode of consciousness”
alive (Winkelman, 2011).
PSYCHOLOGICAL SURVIVAL BY MENTAL
AVOIDANCE: THE VICIOUS CYCLE
Much of the trauma-related dysfunctions are “attempted
solutions to dilemmas which are more focused on survival than
recovery” (Briere, 2002). For instance, when confronted with an
imminent life-threat for which flight-or-fight is no longer an
option to counter danger, the organism may shift to immobility.
To escape the threatening situation as well as the internal distress
and arousal, the response of “shutdown dissociation” may be
adaptive for survival (Schalinski et al., 2015) leading to freezing
or submission.
Many traumatized patients continuously wish to “forget”
their disturbing experiences without being able to do so. In
fact, intrusion and avoidance constitute a vicious cycle rather
than totally independent phenomena. Representing a “rebound”
phenomenon, avoidance or suppression can counterproductively
lead to the state of mind one had hoped to avoid (Wenzlaff and
Wegner, 2000); i.e., an increased tendency to experience mental
intrusions as well as diminished behavioral control (Abramowitz,
2001). Suppressing thoughts can lead to an increase in
behavior related to the formerly suppressed thought (Erskine,
2008; Erskine and Georgiou, 2008). Thought suppression has
been implicated as an etiological and/or maintaining factor
in depression, generalized anxiety disorder, specific phobia,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and PTSD (Purdon, 1999).
In a general population study, suicidality, substance abuse,
dissociation, and problematic activities such as self-injury and
dysfunctional sexual behaviors were all indicators of a robust
latent variable; namely, dysfunctional avoidance (Briere et al.,
2010).
Avoidance and intrusions of traumatic mental content
constitute the basic clinical components of PTSD. These usually
co-occur on an individual basis as do the two types of
response. As the bipolar character of the constellation represents
a detaching of mental contents or even somewhat enduring
“structures” which are “phobic” to each other (Van der Hart et al.,
2006), some authors claim that PTSD is, in fact, a dissociative
disorder (Nijenhuis, 2014). Alternatively, a dissociative subtype
of PTSD has been proposed (Lanius et al., 2010) to delineate
those post-traumatic conditions which are characterized by
overmodulation of emotions. The latter conceptualization has
been adopted in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association,
2013) on the basis of depersonalization and/or derealization
experiences as accompanying symptoms of PTSD. Debate on the
accuracy of these two stances is still ongoing. This is, because,
like PTSD, dissociative disorders are characterized not only
by avoidance (“negative” dissociative symptoms) but also by
intrusions (“positive” dissociative symptoms).
Alternatively, identity alterations observed in dissociative
disorders may be considered an elaborated version of trauma-
related mental intrusions and avoidance which correspond to
the basic mechanism of PTSD. Unlike in PTSD, however,
in DID and its subtreshold forms, traumatic memories are
widely “decontextualized” (Brewin, 2001) and processed to
retain internal and external balance (Öztürk and S¸ar, 2016b).
Further, this leads to formation of “discrete behavioral states”
(Putnam, 1997) each with their own sense of self and agency,
personal history, and mission, subsequent to an elaboration
based on trauma-related cognitions, compensatory structures,
and emotions assigned to them. Namely, DID and PTSD may
precede each other chrononologically or may be co-present
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depending on the status of the patient in the spectrum between
avoidance or intrusion.
Anxiety-laden PTSD can also account for treatment-seeking
in a state of crisis in context of DID. For example, in a
case of “vampirism” with coexisting PTSD and DID, the “host
personality” was suffering from flashbacks due to PTSD while
a disillusioned-traumatized “child” alter personality triggered
violent attacks to be carried out by an aggressive part (Sakarya
et al., 2012). Being unaware of the inner cycle, the patient was
suffering from temporary loss of control following increased
“appetite” for blood. Diminished dissociative barriers may also
lead to emergence of PTSD symptoms during treatment of DID
which were lacking initially.
Dissociation is a constant feature of post-traumatic conditions
independent of the main psychiatric diagnosis (S¸ar and Ross,
2006; S¸ar, 2011b). For example, peritraumatic dissociation is
known as a predictor of PTSD (Van der Hart et al., 2008). While
acute trauma can induce peritraumatic dissociation, complex
trauma leads to chronic dissociation more readily (Ogawa et al.,
1997). In a study on the general population, while childhood
interpersonal (complex) trauma was related to altered self-
capacities (interpersonal conflicts, idealization-disillusionment,
abandonment concerns, identity impairment, susceptibility of
influence, affect disregulation, and tension reduction behaviors),
non-interpersonal traumas and adult traumas were typically
unrelated to the scales assessing these features (Briere and
Rickards, 2007). The main reason for this different effect is
adaptation to trauma in the developmental years—a response of
the whole organism—which has vital importance for the survival
of the growing individual.
In tandem with the notion of a protective detachment of
mind proposed in the present paper, Schimmenti and Caretti
(2016) state that “... dissociation may paradoxically protect the
traumatized child from a fragmentation of the self throughmultiple
disconnections in the self, occurring at both mental and bodily
levels.” In fact, such paradox can be explained only by a duality-
based model of mind allowing detachment in a level other than
alternate personality states: i.e., it is the detached “sociological”
self which is fragmented S¸ar and Öztürk (2005, 2007). Bromberg
(1998, 2011) has proposed that dissociation could be considered
as a proactive strategy used by children to protect themselves
from developmentally traumatic interactions with caregivers that
disrupt the sense of continuity in the self regardless of its natural
multiplicity.
A recent MRI study (Mutluer et al., in press) conducted on
adolescent girls with PTSD due to severe sexual abuse yielded
bilateral decrease in volumes of amygdala, anterior cingulate,
hippocampus, and diminished thickness of prefrontal cortex
compared to the healthy controls. However, analyses within the
PTSD group revealed a tendency of lateralization in findings
showing significant negative correlations between clinical
symptoms of Simple and Complex PTSD and volume changes of
the right hemisphere subcortical structures. A significant positive
correlation was shown between core dissociative phenomena
(depersonalization, derealization, and identity alteration which
fit the dissociative subtype of PTSD or DID) and left frontal
cortical thickness. These findings led the authors to support the
idea that dissociation may be neuroprotective (Ross et al., 2015)
at least until adolescence. In the healthy group, the structures of
right and left hemispheres were better correlated with each other.
In support of the observations previously made by Farina et al.
(2014), this symmetrical appearance of correlations suggested
better connectivity of the brain in the healthy group. Unlike
dissociation, denial or minimization of childhood trauma seemed
to be “toxic” in that it was negatively correlated with the thickness
of the right prefrontal cortex (Mutluer et al., in press).
DISSOCIATION TO “PARALLEL-DISTINCT
STRUCTURES” AND NARROWED
CONSCIOUSNESS
The cardinal feature of dissociation is disruption of usually
integrated mental functions of consciousness, memory,
identity, emotion, perception, behavior, cognition, and/or
motor activities (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Such disruption may lead to discontinuities in sense of self
and agency which cause a disturbance of self-identity. In
his 1889 dissertation, “L’automatisme psychologique,” Pierre
Janet stated that automatisms were the most elementary
form of psychological functioning (Van der Hart and Horst,
1989). Adaptive operations of the evolutionarily bestowed
simple and complex psycho-biological action systems (e.g.,
attachment, sexuality, care-taking, socialization etc.) constitute
the functioning of both normal and dissociative individuals
(Van der Hart et al., 2006). From a contrasting point of view,
post-traumatic dissociation may disrupt both sensori-motor, and
cognitive-emotional functions. The so-called BASK (behavior-
affect-sensorium-knowledge) model of dissociation underlines
this separation of mental functions from each other (Braun,
1988).
I propose that dissociative disruption leads to emergence
of “parallel-distinct” mental structures rather than to simple
disaggregation. In contrast to the BASK model, such parallel-
distinction may have a vertical or horizontal character as valid
for the organization of the nervous and mental system in
general (Echarte, 2016). The horizontal dissociation points to
the altered relationship between higher and lower order brain
structures, changing the status of the hiearchical control. Vertical
dissociation, however, points to the networks covering all levels
of complexity in hierarchy; i.e., from automatisms including
sensori-motor responses to the upper levels of consciousness
such as sense of self (Meares, 1999; Bob and Faber, 2006).
As well as compartmentalization, dissociation may also
lead to detachment. Examples of symptoms of detachment
are: emotional numbing, depersonalization-derealization, out-
of-body experiences, and dissociative amnesia due to encoding
deficit. Those related to compartmentalization are functional
neurological (conversion) symptoms, hypnotic phenomena,
“made” actions (Schneiderian experiences), multiple identities,
and dissociative amnesia due to retrieval deficit. Identity
confusion, on the other hand, is a symptom that can be
associated with either detachment or compartmentalization
(Brown, 2006). Schimmenti and Caretti (2016) have stated that
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“compartmentalization and detachment are two sides of the same
coin; that is, the psychobiological dysregulation deriving from early
relational trauma and the development of competitive self-states
that cannot be integrated into consciousness.”
Recognition of detachment and compartmentalization as
distinct types of dissociation has implications for treatment as
well. Namely, recent evidence suggests that cognitive behavior
therapy, which utilizes an adapted anxiety-disorder model, is an
effective treatment for pathological detachment (Hunter et al.,
2005). Other forms of treatment may be more appropriate for
pathological compartmentalization (Holmes et al., 2005).
Narrowing or alteration of consciousness may also be
considered as types of dissociation. In order to differentiate
pathological dissociative experiences of “trauma-related altered
states of consciousness” (TRASC) from what they considered
to be nondissociative forms of psychological distress (that is,
symptoms that can be readily experienced within “normal
waking consciousness”; NWC), Frewen and Lanius (2014)
operationalized a four-dimensional symptomatology called the
“4-D model.” This model highlights four dimensions of
consciousness affected by traumatic stress, whether in TRASC or
NWC-distress form. These are time-memory (e.g., flashbacks vs.
reminder distress without reliving), thought (e.g., voice hearing
vs. negative self-referential thinking), body (e.g., disembodied
experiences of depersonalization vs. embodied experiences of
distress), and emotion (numbing, affective shutdown vs. non-
dissociative forms of negative emotionality such as fear, anxiety
etc.). While markers of TRASC and NWC predicted social and
occupational impairment in a follow-up study on the acute
aftermath of traumatic events, contrary to hypothesis, childhood
trauma was more strongly correlated with the symptoms of
NWC-distress than with TRASC (Frewen et al., 2015).
The latter finding can be explained by the observation
that long-term consequences of chronic developmental
traumatization such as Complex PTSD may be represented
predominantly by depression and subtle disturbances of
self perceived as passive-influence experiences (S¸ar, 2011a).
Constituting resistances of the “trauma-self ” (Öztürk and
S¸ar, 2016a), such relatively subtle and chronic phenomena
are associated with NWS (i.e., that the individual appears
“normal” but not crisis-prone in daily life) rather than TRASC
which is related to more explicite dissociation. This condition
reflects the secondary phase (“Trauma-Illness” as opposed to
“Inflammation” and “Estrangement” phases) of post-traumatic
process in the proposed “Tri-Modal (T-MR) Reaction Model of
Protection” (Mutluer et al., in press) as inspired by findings of a
recent neurobiological study on adolescent girls with PTSD due
to severe sexual abuse.
CHILDHOOD NEGLECT AND ABUSE:
DISTINCT TRACKS OF POST-TRAUMATIC
RESPONSE
Childhood traumata can arguably be classified into two types is
proposed: those of interpersonal omission (neglect) and intrusion
(abuse). This suggestion is consistent with contemporary
understanding of the bimodal nature of neurobiological response
to traumatic stress, where overmodulation and undermodulation
of emotions are operative (Lanius et al., 2010). Both dichotomies
correspond to the bipolar clinical character of all trauma-related
syndromes including PTSD: namely, intrusion and avoidance of
the traumatic mental content. Treatment needs to take place in
the context of a “therapeutic window” between overwhelming
exposure and excessive avoidance (Briere, 1996, 2002; Porges,
2011).
Four issues seem to prevent researchers from identifying
the distinct impacts of omission and intrusion. First, the
naturalistic co-presence of these patterns for a majority of
studied populations deflects attention from their distinct
cognitive-emotional and sensori-motor consequences. Second,
the discrepancies in results of self-report and clinician-
administered assessment raise questions about the reliability
of these tools. In fact, such discrepancies may represent the
“real” condition; namely that both the subjective experience
and the objective mental status of the evaluated individual
may differ between personal and interpersonal settings. The
latter possibility would be consistent with the very nature
of dissociation as an interpersonal experience sensitive to
betrayal, attachment, and perception. Third, different tracks of
post-traumatic processing may be pursued by sensori-motor
and, alternatively, by cognitive-emotional dissociation. Fourth,
timing of childhood maltreatment (Schalinski and Teicher,
2015) may account for considerable variance in psychological
consequences. Therefore, distinct post-traumatic phenomena
should be assessed and handled separately even if they occur
concurrently.
The partial phenomenological overlap between borderline
personality disorder (BPD) and dissociative disorders -which
both have a trauma-related origin- has been well-documented
by empirical research (Korzekwa et al., 2009; Brand et al.,
2016). For example, in a controlled study of a high-functioning
college population (S¸ar et al., 2006), a significant overlap between
the two syndromes was substantiated: 72.5% of those with
BPD had a dissociative disorder in contrast to only 15.0% of
the non-BPD controls. Although some authors consider BPD
a dissociative disorder (Meares, 2012), and others take an
opposite stance by regarding dissociative disorders in the realm
of BPD (Lauer et al., 1993), such overlap does not necessarily
discard the possibility of existence of two qualitatively distinct
entities.
The question arises whether such overlap is also related to
co-existence of different types of developmental trauma. To
test this hypothesis, a multivariate statistical analysis allowed
S¸ar et al. (2006) to calculate the distinct relationships between
the two syndromes and reports of various types of childhood
trauma separately. According to this study, BPD was predicted
by overall severity of childhood trauma, childhood sexual abuse
(SA), emotional abuse (EA), physical abuse (PA), and physical
neglect (PN). Dissociative disorders, on the other hand, were
predicted by childhood emotional neglect (EN) and denial
(minimization of trauma including idealization of parents)
of childhood adversities. Apparently, BPD was related to the
intrusion (both bodily and psychological) and bodily omission
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whereas dissociative disorders were related to the psychological
omission only. The two clinical response patterns did not
markedly interact according to any childhood trauma measure.
Although both syndromes have their own important histories
of conceptualization, the existing empirical data do not rule out
the possibility that they represent two types of post-traumatic
response.
Apart from a potential personality disorder, a similar pattern
can be observed at themore severe pole of the psychopathological
spectrum. In a study on patients with schizophrenic disorder (S¸ar
et al., 2010b), those patients who had high scores of dissociation
(and who had elevated negative symptoms, childhood trauma
total, and childhood EN scores) were divided into two further
subgroups in cluster analysis. The first was characterized by
childhood EA (psychological trauma of intrusive type) and
predominantly had symptoms associated with DID and positive
symptoms. This group, who reported dissociation directly, had
earlier age of onset and longer duration of the disorder. The
second group was characterized by childhood PA and SA as well
as by PN (“bodily trauma” of both intrusion and omission types).
The latter group had more BPD criteria, somatic complaints, and
general psychiatric comorbidity which represented dissociation
indirectly.
A recent follow-up study on patients with bipolar disorder
(Çakir et al., 2016) documented that among patients who
received anticonvulsant treatment, those with elevated childhood
EA and PA scores (intrusion) had poorer outcome in terms
of relapse (a trait measure). Among omission types of
trauma, while PN was related to mean severity of the mood
disorder episodes and psychotic features, EN was related to
suicide attempts. Hence, unlike the unipolar (dissociative)
depression described below, omission type of trauma predicted
the severity of the state. The childhood trauma total score
was related to psychotic features, the number of lifetime
comorbid psychiatric disorders and the number of courses of
antidepressant drug treatment. The latter was also associated
with comorbid diagnosis of lifetime diagnosis of PTSD. Unlike
for the anticonvulsant treatment group, lithium non-responders
were more common among patients with lifetime diagnosis of
PTSD.
Apparently, nosological fragmentation (increased general
psychiatric comorbidity) is one of the outcomes of developmental
traumatization which is facilitated by total severity of childhood
abuse and neglect in bipolar disorder and bodily type of
childhood adversity inschizophrenia. This phenomenon requires
further addressing via epigenetical research. While reported
observations on patients with schizophrenia replicated findings
on the relationship between EN (omission) and dissociation
in non-clinical populations (Ogawa et al., 1997; S¸ar et al.,
2006), different types of intrusive traumatization (for instance,
emotional vs. bodily abuse) seem to have distinct clinical
consequences. While bodily intrusion may lead more readily to
indirect symptoms of dissociation, emotional intrusion, however,
seems to be related to positive symptoms (e.g., hallucinations of
voice-hearing type) which constitute the third person perspective
of consciousness according to the 4-D model (Frewen and
Lanius, 2014).
EMBODIED TRAUMA AND BODILY
DISSOCIATION: CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
S¸ar (2011a, 2015b) has proposed the term “dissociative
depression” for a complex post-traumatic condition which
may involve features of BPD and transient feelings of loss of
control in addition to the symptoms of unipolar depression and
dissociation. In a study among women in the general population,
dissociative depression (current major depression comorbid with
lifetime diagnosis of dissociative disorder) was predicted by
educational deprivation and childhood SA (S¸ar et al., 2013a).
In the same sample, childhood PA, lifetime diagnosis of major
depression and/or dissociative disorder predicted functional
neurological (conversion) symptoms (a type of sensori-motor
dissociation; S¸ar et al., 2009). While dissociative depression was
related to a combination of omission and bodily intrusion of
sexual type, PA (bodily intrusion of non-sexual type) added
sensori-motor dissociation to this condition possibly due to
unassimilated sensori-motor reactions; i.e., somatic memory).
A different appearance was obtained in a study (Kiliç et al.,
2014) of women with a physical illness which explored the
relationship of post-traumatic anger and cognitive-emotional
and sensori-motor dissociation to unipolar depression. The
diagnosis of lifetime depressive disorder (a trait measure)
was predicted by sensori-motor dissociation whereas cognitive-
emotional dissociation was related to current severity of
depression (a state measure). The former track was associated
with childhood neglect while the latter was related to abuse.
While similarly leading to depression as the final common
pathway, the consequences of childhood neglect (omission) and
abuse (intrusion) were associated with distinct trajectories.
A study on women with back pain or headache (Yücel
et al., 2002) found no relationship between childhood adversity
and cognitive-emotional dissociation. However, sensori-motor
dissociation was predicted by EN; hence the statements “the
body keeps the score” (Van der Kolk, 1994) and “embodied”
dissociation (Lanius et al., 2014) are valid. The question arises
whether the relationship between childhood adversity and its
consequences follow a different track among patients with
a somatic illness. However, the special relationship between
childhood neglect and body perception was reported in a non-
clinical college population as well: Both childhood PN and EN
were associated with symptoms of bodily depersonalization while
childhood abuse did not (S¸ar et al., 2017b).
A recent case report describing “unperceived (total denial of)
pregnancy” (S¸ar et al., 2017c) ends with the words of the affected
young woman who underlines the connection between loss of
trust and the feeling of being abandoned by one’s own body:
“It is really hard for me to describe how I feel about the denial of
pregnancy. I know that, in the weeks following the birth, I asked
myself a lot of questions about it. I felt betrayed by my body. I
felt like my body was a part of me that I can’t control. I thought
that if my body did this to me, and hid all these things from me,
I could not be certain about anything that I felt, or anything that
I thought about me. The main feeling that I had, was to not trust
myself anymore.”
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Kierkegaard, while inquiring mind-body relationships, was
inspiring about the potential protective nature of mental division
and dissociative depression. He described “unhappiness” (alias
depression) as “a suffering which must have its basis in a mis-
relation between... mind and body, for it has no relation to (one’s)
spirit, which on the contrary, because of the tension between... mind
and body... gain(s) an uncommon resiliency” (Marino, 2009, para.
9). Vice versa, in his well-known presentation (“Television”),
French psychiatrist Lacan (1974/1990, p. 6) pointed to the
associative mission of the body in conditions of a detached
internal world:
“In fact the subject of the unconscious is only in touch with
the soul via the body, by introducing thought into it: here
contradicting Aristotle. Man does not think with his soul, as the
Philosopher imagined. He thinks as a consequence of the fact that
a structure, that of language—the word implies it—a structure
carves up his body, a structure that has nothing to do with
anatomy. Witness the hysteric. This shearing happens to the soul
through the obsessional symptom: a thought that burdens the soul
that it doesn’t know what to do with. Thought is in disharmony
with the soul.”
Nevertheless, one has to be careful in interpreting Lacan’s usage
of the word unconscious which he anchores in external reality:
“There is no unconscious except for the speaking being,” ... “the
others, who possess being only through being named—even though
they impose themselves from within the real-,”... “it speaks, does
the unconscious, so that it depends on language” (ibid, p. 5). The
research on embodied trauma and bodily dissociation, however,
has the potential to illuminate the lost link of communication
between “unformulated experience” (Stern, 1997) and the illness
as expression of it: the psychosomatics.
BEING “UNABLE TO SPEAK”: IN SEARCH
FOR A (COMMON) LANGUAGE
Indeed, trauma explicitely disrupts the capacity to develop
consistent narratives of experiences (Van der Hart et al., 2006) for
reasons which include dissociative amnesias (S¸ar et al., 2014a).
The dual representation theory of PTSD (Brewin, 2001) assumes
that many details of the traumatic experience are retained in
the “situationally accessible memory” (SAM) rather than the
“verbally accessible memory” (VAM). According to the multiple
code theory of emotional processing, inhibition of a transition
from the subsymbolic (patterns of sensory and visceral sensations
and motoric activity associated with states of emotional arousal)
to the symbolic (images and words) level of thinking (Bucci,
2007) which hinders the integration between emotion and
cognition.
While Lacan’s interest in trauma and the impact of “the real”
was part of a meta-psychological model, Ferenczi (1932/1995)
attempted to directly solve a clinical problem.This is shown in
his Clinical Diaries (Kirschner, 2015). In his well-known paper
which considered the interpersonal dynamics of the condition,
(Ferenczi, 1932/1988) referred to the “confusion of tongues”
between adult and child in the context of sexual abuse. Lacan’s
approach to trauma as the presence of the effect of unsymbolized
real physical experiences seems to be in accordance with
Ferenczi’s notion of the unprocessed foreign body in the psyche
(Garon, 1993 cited by Kirschner, 2015). Like Ferenczi’s concept
of foreign body (Kirschner, 2015), the Lacanian concept of an
inassimilable “real” that cannot be contained in the symbolic (of
speech) suggests an implantation of otherness in the psyche that
produces effects.
According to the “Theory of Functional Dissociation of
Self ” (S¸ar and Öztürk, 2007), depressive phenomena, loss of
interpersonal mutuality and functional somatic experiences are
resistances of the “trauma-self ” (Öztürk and S¸ar, 2016a). They
require resolution in psychotherapy to repair the detaching of
“sociological” and “psychological” selves. This is the point at
which therapist and patient meet each other. In order to be
therapeutic, such meeting should facilitate establishment of a
“common language” not only between therapist and client but
also between and across sociological and psychological selves (of
both parties).
DISSOCIATION AND ATTACHMENT:
PERSONAL AND INTERPERSONAL
Dissociation is not only an intrapsychic and psychosomatic
(embodied) but also an interpersonal phenomenon (Liotti, 2006).
The latter contributes to the dynamism of dissociation in
terms of the contextual factors affecting the condition of the
individual. Hence both Liotti (2006) and Barach (1991) have
underlined the role of interpersonal attachment disturbances
in DID. Liotti (2006) proposes that pathological dissociation
should be viewed as a “primarily intersubjective reality hindering
the integrative processes of consciousness,” rather than as
an intrapsychic defense against mental pain. Additionally,
early defenses against attachment-related dissociation may
lead to interpersonal controlling strategies that further inhibit
the attachment system. Dissociative symptoms emerge as a
consequence of the breakdown of these defensive strategies when
exposed to events that activate the attachment system.
In the view of Liotti (2006), it was Bowlby (1973) who first
hinted at the relationship between attachment processes and
dissociation. Namely, Bowlby proposed that inadequate care-
seeking interactions with primary caregivers could lead the
infant to develop multiple internal representations of self and
attachment figures (which he called Internal Working Models;
IWM). One IWM becomes dominant in regulating interpersonal
relationships in a certain context, while the other IWMs remain
separated from mainstream conscious experience. The latter
surface in stressful situations to regulate emotions and cognitions
in a way that may be perceived as alien to the person’s usual sense
of self. In addition, sense of agency is influenced by this alteration.
Liotti (2006) suggests that the shifts among the multiple
IWMs correspond to the drama triangle elaborated by Karpman
(1968); i.e., the interactions between the main characters oscillate
between the roles of the benevolent rescuer, the malevolent
persecutor, and the helpless victim. The link between attachment
theory and the drama triangle is represented in the model of
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attachment to the perpetrator (Ross, 1997) which allows the
victim to achieve a subjective sense of control in the abusive
condition. Hence, according to Liotti (2006), psychotherapy for
pathological dissociation should be a phase-oriented process
focused primarily on achieving attachment security, and should
only secondarily deal with trauma. Therapeutic interventions
aimed at disavoval of the “attachment to the perpetrator,” both
inside the internal world and in external reality, are necessary to
eliminate such destructive bonds. Disavowal of the attachment to
the perpetrator, however, may require some type of trauma work.
Although the therapist would try to act as a secure base
to improve alliance and symptom control (Cronin et al.,
2014), this does not mean that the therapist’s security would
necessarily lead to the patient’s security. Before treating trauma,
the theapist cannot know what the client may perceive as
sufficiently safe (Bromberg, 2006). Individuals who report high
levels of dissociative experiences also present a negative view
of themselves in attachment and close relationships (S¸ar et
al., 2010a; Schimmenti, 2016). This may limit their potential
to trust in themselves and to improve the quality of their
relationship including the relationship with the therapist. Hence,
if developmental trauma is not processed; i.e., a better level of
integration and wholeness is not attained, attachment security
may be difficult to achieve by highly dissociative individuals.
This requires elimination of the resistances of the trauma-self
(Öztürk and S¸ar, 2016a). The conception of the “sociological self ”
(S¸ar and Öztürk, 2007, 2013), however, serves to fit the needs of
interpersonal attachment. The aspect of self desribed by this term
is prone to fragmentation due to the conflictual demands of the
external world. Hence, the trauma-self should be liberated from
“guardianship” of the sociological self to operate in a problem-
solving manner and on the basis of reality (S¸ar and Öztürk,
2005).
In his schema on three levels of object (interpersonal)
relationships, Battegay (2008) mentioned “fusion” (a basic feeling
of being “one” with the “object,” or as an alternative explanation,
an intense feeling of attachment), “active performances (defense
mechanisms) of ego” as two levels before a “mature” (reality-
oriented) contact is possible. Projective identification serves as
a regulator of interpersonal distance (e.g., by inducing anger
as an aversive factor) in conditions where fusion becomes
unbearable (Battegay, 2008). In fact, projective identification
is based on interpersonal dissociation where the subject of
emotions, thoughts, and behavior becomes contentious (Howell,
2003). The capacity of fusion may turn to a threat to individual
autonomy in certain conditions, leading to loss of boundaries.
We can observe this both in relation to crowds, communities, but
also small groups (“group en masse,” Battegay, 2008) when they
are under the influence of mass affect (which liberates capacities
for fusion).
Individuals who become members of a cult or terrorist
organization (e.g., the so called “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”)
and engage in destructive acts (e.g., “suicide bombing”) may
be contemporary examples of malignant liberation of fusionary
tendencies. Such identifications seem to be a consequence of
extremely detached and expanded “sociological selves” which
both enable and facilitate “mind control” (Vogt, 2012) conducted
by any source of abusive power. “Sociological self ” is also
the origin of pathological and non-pathological possession
experiences which constitute a currency of exchange with
others in the transitional area between individual and society
(Winkelman, 2011). They are perceived as external entities
controlling the person. Unlike the individual alter personalities,
they can affect and even “intrude” others as well; (hence, are
entities “shared” in the community). Experiences of possession
are associated not only with developmental traumatization but
also with PTSD related to stressful events of adulthood (S¸ar et al.,
2014b). Creating a cultural equivalent of the dissociative subtype
of PTSD, they seem to be a way of coping with environmental
threat.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PHOBIAS: THE
NEED—FEAR DILEMMA
The concept of trauma refers to a stressor located in the
external world. However, this does not prevent the traumatic
“experience” from having subjective components (Fischer and
Riedesser, 1999). While prevention and recognition of trauma by
the community are important, limiting the focus to the objective
component of trauma would lead the therapist to helplessness
in the face of the “cold facts.” Subjectivity, on the other
hand, allows avenues of processing the traumatic experience via
psychotherapeutic treatment. Thus, notwithstanding its focus on
trauma due to environmental stress, this paper accords with the
statement that “it is not possible to expiate the stressful external
reality without solving the dilemma in the internal world of
the patient” (Kalsched, 1996) because “the enemy who started
on the outside is transformed into an inner torment” (Van der
Kolk, 2011). The traumatized psyche becomes self-traumatizing
(Kalsched, 1996, p. 5). Hence, the healing process has to be
navigated from within.
In their “preliminary” paper, Breuer and Freud (1893/1999)
stated: “We must presume rather that the psychical trauma -or
more precisely the memory of the trauma—acts like a foreign
body which long after its entry must continue to be regarded as
an agent that is still at work; and we find the evidence for this in a
highly remarkable phenomenon which at the same time lends an
important practical interest to our findings.” While mentioning
the relationship between internal world and external reality, Jung
(1912) underlined dissociative aspect of this condition as well:
“Neurosis is intimately bound up with the problem of our time
and really represents an unsuccessful attempt on the part of
the individual to solve the general problem in his own person.
Neurosis is self division.”
DID and its subthreshold forms are characterized by “internal
phobias” (Steele et al., 2001) against traumatic memories and
alternate personality states which are complex derivatives of these
memories, including anthropomorphisation, usually perceived as
internal figures. This inner world constitutes an “internal family
system” (Schwartz, 1995) comprised of members carrying roles
and trauma-related “schemas” (Young et al., 2003). This is a
“non-democratic” world characterized by oppression, rigidity,
and dependency. Such relationships are also trasferred to the
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external world. Hence, frightening figures in the inner world
of the patient co-exist with “internal self-helpers.” Members
of the internal system are in relationship with each other as
well as with significant others in the external world. However,
internal phobias trigger distance to the content of the internal
worldin the subject, rendering the dissociative amnesia noticable
to the observer (e.g., intra-interview trance or amnesia) without
facilitating entry of the interviewer into the fearful internal world
of the patient (i.e., due to the phobia of the latter).
In purely descriptive screening studies, the most frequently
seen personality disorders in DID are borderline, paranoid,
compulsive, avoidant, and dependent types (Ellason et al., 1996;
Kiziltan et al., 1998). This somewhat contradictory combination
of traits which carry components of all three DSM-5 personality
disorder clusters (i.e., A, B, and C) describes the traumatized
person who lives in an alarmed “self-preservation” mode, rather
than benefiting from a relaxed “self-regulation” mode (Ford,
2009). Compared to the non-dissociative depressive patients,
patients with a dissociative disorder reported both preoccupied
and fearful styles of attachment more frequently (S¸ar et al.,
2010a). Representing D-type attachment (Liotti, 2006), this fits
the constellation of the “need-fear dilemma” also known as
Schopenhauer’s “hedgehog’s dilemma” (Schimmenti and Caretti,
2016); i.e., simultaneous need for and also fear of an event, object,
or individual due to possible re-traumatization. This dilemma
has been proposed to describe the immense need of the autistic
schizophrenic individual for interpersonal contact but also the
simultaneous anxiety and feeling of being threatened by close and
intimate relationships (Burnham et al., 1969).
Dissociative individuals live under the influence of both
negative self- and negative-other models which undermine any
hope and will for emancipation (S¸ar et al., 2010a; Schimmenti,
2016). The “double bind” (Bateson et al., 1956) situation here
represents a tendency to become entrapped in interpersonal
relationships, which seems to be a consequence of loss of basic
trust both in oneself and others due to the post-traumatic
disillusionment (Fischer and Riedesser, 1999). Hence, threats
against a sense of security and control may also originate from the
internal world of the patients. Such experiences may constitute
a chronic source of anxiety, and lead to diverse symptoms
accompanying the strivings of the individual to ameliorate this
fear.
Howell (2003) conceptualized pathological narcissism
as a trauma-related condition and the interpersonal aspect
of dissociation. The presence of overblown self-object
representations in the internal world may be a consequence
of non-availability of appropriate relationships in the external
world. This corresponds to childhood neglect. Battegay (1987)
objected also to conceptualization of pathological narcissism as
a “personality disorder.” He proposed instead, classifying it as a
narcissistic “neurosis” related to adversities of early childhood
(neglect in particular). This problem is also valid in the opposite
direction; i.e., attachment to internal self-objects prevents
healthy interchange with the external world and interferes
with true intimacy in close relationships. With the concept
of “self-object,” psychoanalytic self psychology emphasized
the interpersonal attachment and underlined the problem of
interpersonal boundaries as well as disturbances of self-identity
as a consequence of the “weak” self in pathological narcissism
(Kohut, 1971).
Many patients with dissociative disorders unsuccesfully
struggle alone for several years with their condition to achieve
an improvement (self-reparation or self-treatment) before the
appropriate diagnosis is made by a clinician (Öztürk and S¸ar,
2016b). It is a desperate struggle, because the dissociative “ghetto”
(Frankel and O’Hearn, 1996) of the internal world is self-
perpetuating. It can not be solved without an intervention from the
external world; i.e., being “touched” (Kuechenhoff, 2007). This
work is the essence of the treatment of the post-traumatic self.
In his sensitive text on “clinical psychotherapy” for psychosis,
Benedetti (1992) underlined the importance of the point at which
a symbolic act of “transgression” on the part of the therapist
became vital to achieving the treatment goal. A recent survey
documented that experienced therapists reported that some type
of boundary modification occurred in their treatment of post-
traumatic conditions (Sachs, 2013). Careful assessment of the
dynamics of such modifications requires the highest level of skill
in psychotherapeutic practice.
BEING ALONE AND WITH OTHERS:
PERCEPTUAL FLUCTUATIONS
The interpersonal nature of dissociative disorders is
misinterpreted by some clinicians (Chodoff, 1997) and
researchers (somewhat strangely, in the name of an alleged
“sociocognitive” model) as a proof for their iatrogenesis. In fact,
dissociative disorders indeed have sociocognitive origins (as do
several psychiatric disorders and psychological trauma itself).
Hence a truly sociocognitive etiology neither excludes the role of
psychological trauma in the origin of dissociative disorders, nor
constitutes proof of iatrogenesis (S¸ar et al., 2013b).
The influence of the observer on the subject to be assessed is
recognized even in exact sciences such as physics and computer
programming. This cannot be expected to be different in clinical
psychology and psychiatry, which work on subjectivities as well as
objectivities. There are software bugs in computers which seem
to disappear or alter behavior when one attempts to study it
(Raymond, 1996); an effect called “Heisen bug” in remembrance
of the thesis by Werner Heisenberg, the physicist who first
asserted the observer effect of quantum mechanics, stating that
the act of observing a system inevitably alters its state. One may
also have different experiences about oneself when alone or in the
presence of others.
Discrepancies in self-report and clinician assessment have
been reported for BPD (Edell et al., 1990). In a study on
college students who had either a dissociative disorder or
BPD or both, there were significant differences between self-
reported and clinician-rated symptom scores (S¸ar et al., 2014a,
2017a,b). Compared to dissociative disorders, BPD was related
to an awareness of dissociative amnesia, depersonalization,
and identity alteration in self-report more readily than the
clinical interview. Participants with dissociative disorders were
unable to report dissociative amnesia in self-assessment possibly
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due to “amnesia to amnesia” (Kluft, 1988). Hiddenness of
the selected dissociative symptoms in BPD during clinical
interview may be interpreted in two ways; i.e., a feature
directly related to the psychopathology or the de facto
diagnostic preference in the absence of self-report assessment.
Nevertheless, underreporting of amnesia, identity alteration, and
depersonalization-derealization in clinical interview may lead to
overdiagnosis of BPD in patients with dissociative disorders (S¸ar
et al., 2017a).
Such fluctuations in assessment may pertain to the self-
system of the individual with a dissociative disorder (with or
without BPD). This may involve hidden influences of non-
executive personality states, or which may cause covert switching
of distinct mental states during assessment contingent on
perceptual alterations to traumatic memories (Beere, 2009a,b).
Beere (2009b) has demonstrated that as the dissociative
psychopathology entered the DID range (the most severe end
of the dissociation spectrum), reports of amnesia appeared to
decrease (although it is known clinically that there is more
amnesia among those manifesting DID than manifested in this
particular subgroup). The presence of an interviewer clearly
represents a situation that is the model setting of interpersonal
attachment, which has a crucial importance for the studied
population (Liotti, 2006). Apparently, the presence of a clinician
(interpersonal situation) or aloneness during assessment may
have distinct effects on the mental status of the evaluated subject.
If so, what is the relationship between this effect and the two
diagnostic patterns?
Individuals with BPD were reported to have significantly
better performances in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
(RMET). This is a measure of capacity to discriminate the
mental state of others from expressions in the eye region of
the face (Fertuck et al., 2009). Antidepressant medication status,
PTSD co-occurrence, current vs. past depression, and childhood
physical or sexual abuse did not predict this observation. Indeed,
BPD seems to be related to a greater “interpersonal (external)
phobia” and to increased vigilance against perceived threats in
interpersonal situations. This would lead to a preponderance of
memory continuity in the self-system during a clinical interview,
e.g., by taking over of executive personality states. Interestingly,
based on data collected from clinical and non-clinical subjects,
Kaehler and Freyd (2009) found that higher “betrayal” traumas
are associated with greater BPD characteristics. Among college
students, none of the childhood trauma scores except SA was
correlated with clinician-rated dissociative amnesia; however,
such correlation existed for all trauma types in self-report
(S¸ar et al., 2014a). Nevertheless, all types of childhood trauma
and both types of dissociative amnesia were correlated with
total number of criteria of BPD as the common final pathway
representing the severity of the condition, and, even that of
dissociation (S¸ar et al., 2017b).
Underlining the significance of “betrayal” (Freyd, 1994), in
a neurobiological study on adolescent girls with PTSD due to
severe sexual abuse (Mutluer et al., in press), those abused by
their biological father or brother (i.e., perpetrator in “closer”
relationship with the victim) reported more dissociative amnesia
and absorption compared to victims of other perpetrators. They
also had smaller left anterior cingulate while right anterior
cingulate was larger in coitus group (i.e., more severe abusive
act) compared to those with other types of SA. Both these
psychological and neurobiological phenomena may point to a
possible strivings of the organism to manage the psychological
pain (e.g., by denial, attachment to the perpetrator, dissociative
amnesia, and estrangement).
REALITY TESTING AND DISTORTION OF
REALITY: DISSOCIATION AND LOSS OF
INSIGHT
Dissociation is a way of dealing with reality (S¸ar and
Öztürk, 2005) while trying “to link the overwhelming with
the unbearable” (Schimmenti and Caretti, 2016). Psychological
trauma represents a breaking point in human life characterized
by a drastic change in reality which requires the re-adaptation of
the affected individual to the emerging condition. Psychological
treatment of such conditions should assist the subject to
transition “between realities.” Such transition may entail creation
of a new self-definition for an upcoming stage of life while
integrating the past, where “lost” identities are sometimes also
“found” during the process of psychotherapy. Interpersonal
developmental trauma occurs in context of distortion of reality
by the perpetrator; i.e., betrayal. Betrayal trauma theory suggests
that dissociation is an adaptive response to childhood abuse,
which allows survival by enabling the child to maintain
attachment to a figure vital to her/his development (Freyd,
1994).
According to pioneering trauma clinician and researcher
Janet, mental health is characterized by a high capacity
for integration which unites a broad range of psychological
phenomena within one personality (Van der Kolk and Van der
Hart, 1989). To achieve this, and in addition to a general capacity
for synthesis in the central nervous system, “realization” (not
only accepting and recognizing experiences as real but also
contextualizing them in order to obtain meaning) of experiences
is required. This requires “personalization” (claiming ownership)
and “presentification” (ability to differentiate between past,
present, and future) of the experience. Traumatic stress
jeopardizes these abilities, thereby leading to dissociation with
diminished awareness, comprehension, and self-control. In
both normal and abnormal functioning, reflexive self-awareness
is crucial but can be disturbed by the tension that arises
from coordinating subjective and objective perspectives about
oneself.
In his psychoanalitic essay “Standing in the Spaces,”
Bromberg (1998) elaborated the “normal multiplicity” of the self.
Paradoxically, he considers dissociation primarily as the means
through which the individual maintains personal continuity,
coherence, and integrity of the sense of self in front of the
unbearable reality. Dissociation allows the existence of several
different (subjective) versions of reality within one person.
Thus Kluft (1993) once called DID “multiple reality disorder”
(rather than multiple personality disorder) and referred to
“alternating reality states” (Kluft, 2003). Somewhat similarly,
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Chefetz (2004) refers to identity alteration in DID as “isolated
subjectivities.” Paradoxically, distinct or “alter” personality states
are not disintegrated structures only but they also represent a
striving of re-establishment of the lost unity (S¸ar and Öztürk,
2005).
Being able to differentiate fantasy from reality is critical
in achieving the integrative mode of consciousness (Öztürk
and S¸ar, 2016b). “Trance-logic” (i.e., the tolerance and/or
rationalization of logical inconsistency while in a hypnotic
state) which is a core aspect of the cognition of DID
patients (Loewenstein, 1993), allows the patient to adjust to
“normal” daily life while maintaining beliefs which are not
only inconsistent with external reality but may be contradictory
among themselves.This is a phenomenon resembling one of
Bleuler’s (1911) observations of schizophrenia (which does
not reference dissociation)—namely, “double bookkeeping”
(doppelte Buchführung). Hence, the dissociative patient’s claim
to have another person inside him/herself, or to have more
than one personality, should not be considered a delusion
per-se.
An intriguing aspect of such trance-logic that has important
behavioral consequences is related to variations in the belief that
dissociative identities are separate. At the extreme end, one finds
patients who view dissociative identities as almost like “real-
world friends.” In some cases, the “murderous” intention of a
“persecutory” part against the “host” personality may lead to
and be equated with a suicide attempt. This may even lead to
a completed suicide due to failure to comprehend that both
parts belong to the same person. Putnam (1989) has called this
phenomenon “internal homicide.” Such experiences can also
mimic paranoid conditions, as when a persecutory dissociative
identity is projected onto a person or directly perceived as a
hallucination in the outside world. From an external vantage
point, this would look like a delusion of persecution unless
the dissociative identities involved are identified as the source
of the experience. Nevertheless, with the exception of this
“circumscribed psychosis,” even these patients do not lose reality
testing in other domains of life.
In an empirical study, patients with a dissociative disorder
had better cognitive insight than patients with a schizophrenic
disorder, and did not differ from those with obsessive
compulsive disorder or major depression (S¸ar et al., 2012).
However, unlike the latter two groups, dissociative patients
were similar to the schizophrenic group in terms of heightened
“self-certainty.” Nevertheless, the “self-reflection” scores of
patients with dissociative disorder were better than those
of the schizophrenia patients (which placed their overall
cognitive insight in the non-psychotic range). This “dissociation
paradox” (S¸ar et al., 2012) is possibly attributable to defensive
persistence by the traumatized individual who perceives threats
in their environment. Interestingly, a recent study on a college
population, participants with BPD tended to report “detachment
from reality” more readily than those with a dissociative disorder
(S¸ar et al., 2017b).
The American Psychiatric Glossary defines reality testing as
the ability to evaluate the external world objectively and to
differentiate adequately between it and the internal world (Stone,
1988). Impaired reality testing is one of the major hallmarks of
psychosis. Although the “internal world” is especially complex
in DID, it is rarely confused with “external reality.” Where
this happens, it is only in a time-limited and/or circumscribed
fashion.
Reality testing is intact in patients with dissociative disorders
except during dissociative psychotic episodes (where the latter
may constitute crisis states superimposed on the ongoing
dissociative pathology) or those conditions when the patient’s
belief on the separateness of personality states takes a delusional
scope. Loss of insight due to chronic or acute dissociation can
also have forensic implications in criminal cases (McFarlane,
1998).
CRISIS OF SECURITY AND
SELF-CONTROL: TURNING “INSIDE OUT”
Concerns about security and control may lead to a crisis
for dissociative patients which may interrupt their daily
functioning including transient impairment of reality testing.
Two syndromes may dominate the frontline clinical picture
of a patient with DID in this regard: functional neurological
(conversion) symptoms and acute dissociative reactions. The
two conditions represent the most dramatic versions of sensori-
motor and cognitive-emotional dissociation. Both may co-occur
and, even, may be superimposed on DID (Nijenhuis et al.,
1998). They are frightening for the affected patients as well
as for their close social network. For example, with their
seemingly life-threatening nature, sensori-motor dissociative
symptoms such as non-epileptic seizures constitute a medical
emergency (S¸ar et al., 2007). In a clinical series of patients
with dissociative disorders, somatic symptoms predicted suicidal
ideation (Öztürk and S¸ar, 2008). Many patients with DID
are admitted to psychiatric services subsequent to treatment-
resistant and dramatic conversion symptoms including non-
epileptic seizures (Tezcan et al., 2003; S¸ar et al., 2004).
Severe acute dissociative reactions with psychotic features
have been known as hysterical or as reactive dissociative
psychosis (Van der Hart et al., 1993) which may resemble a
delirium, mania, schizophrenic disorder (S¸ar and Öztürk, 2009).
Dissociative psychosis of patients with DID consists of “revolving
door crisis” (Putnam, 1989) whereby the alter personalities
compete for control (Tutkun et al., 1996) or a temporary
breakdown of dissociative barriers leading to a “co-consciousness
crisis” (Kluft, personal communication, 1995).
Nevertheless, acute sensori-motor or cognitive-emotional
crises serve as a “cry for help” in difficult contexts including
cessation of threats of an abusive environment. Thus, they
constitute an “exit” strategy of the “system” (sometimes the
last before a collapse which leads to attempted or completed
suicide). Such crises may also occur in context of power struggle
or a threat to attachment. Significantly, such struggle may
occur in the “internal world” of the patients (usually between
personality states in conflict) as well as in the external world
(usually with family members and/or further significant others).
Nevertheless, both “worlds” may trigger each other. Regaining a
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sense of security and control requires at least a temporary balance
between them usually obtained by interventions in both spheres.
CULTURAL PREPONDERANCE OF
UNIVERSAL PATTERNS:
EXTRATENSITIVITY AND
INTROTENSITIVITY
Interaction between internal and external worlds occurs
in the context of the cultural environment. In a single
case study on DID using the Rorschach projective test in
Turkey, the “extratensitivity” of the patient diminished after
psychotherapeutic treatment leading to integration (S¸ar et al.,
2002). The concurrent diagnosis of BPD dropped as well. These
findings contradict the reports on North American dissociative
patients who appear to have a predominantly internally focused
coping style (Armstrong and Loewenstein, 1990). Nevertheles, a
study on identity alteration in Turkish college students yielded
separate dimensions representing either “mental intrusions
from within” or those characterized by “externalization” of the
dissociative experience (S¸ar et al., 2017a).
“Introtensive” means emphasizing thought, fantasy, and
imagination, or inner life (internally focused coping style). A
subject who focuses upon affective response to the environment
as his base of experience is called “extratensive” (externally
focused coping style). The change in Rorschach responses
of this patient is in accordance with impaired impulsiveness
after treatment. Interestingly, in a comparison of Turkish and
Dutch patients with DID, large differences existed between the
two groups in BPD diagnostic criteria met rather than the
core dissociative symptoms (S¸ar et al., 1996). Namely, Turkish
patients reported intense anger and lack of control of this
emotion, chronic feelings of emptiness and boredom, efforts
to avoid abandonment, and intense but unstable relationships
more frequently than Dutch patients. In turn, Dutch patients
reported frequent mood swings, physically self-damaging acts,
identity confusion, and impulsive and unpredictable behavior
more frequently than Turkish patients. Some type of affect
dysregulation was common to both groups (Chefetz, 2005).
The dichotomy of internal and external phobias seems to be
operative here. Apparently, BPD criteria represented both the
personal and interpersonal aspects of dissociation among these
patients (S¸ar, 2006). Being part of a relational culture, Turkish
patients had more symptoms in the interpersonal area inspiring
attachment disturbances (behavior influenced by “external
interpersonal phobias”) more frequently than Dutch patients
who seemed to struggle in their internal world individually
(behavior infuenced by “internal phobias”). These differences
in predominant post-traumatic response types may be related
not only to cultural factors affecting symptom presentation (e.g.,
overall lifestyle, drug abuse, family relationships) and sanctions
on disclosure of trauma, but also to etiological factors.
Awareness about the traumatic nature of life experiences may
be affected by the cultural environment. This is apparent in a
study of women with somatization disorder living in a semi-rural
region of of eastern Turkey (Taycan et al., 2014). Participants in
this study had been exposed to every type of trauma endemically
but had limited awareness of the nature of their environment.
As well as functional somatic complaints, possession (i.e., non-
delusional passive influence experience attributed to external
entities) rather thanclassical cognitive-emotional dissociation
was among main predictors of the diagnosis.
Trauma may be “invisible” as observed in overprotective
childrearing as a type of interpersonal intrusion. This is known
to be relatively common in Turkey, including among the
well-educated middle and middle-upper class. For example,
adolescents with DID and its subthreshold forms did not
differ significantly from non-dissociative adolescent psychiatric
outpatients on childhood abuse and neglect and family
dysfunctionality scores as assessed by self-report measures
(S¸ar et al., 2014c). However, the dissociative group had more
comorbid separation anxiety disorder compared to controls
possibly due to attachment disturbances. The instrument used
to assess childhood trauma did not cover overprotection—
overcontrol by parents. In fact, this self-compensatory behavior
of traumatized parents leads to intergenerational transition of
trauma. This style not only threatens interpersonal boundaries
and private individual spheres, but is overwhelming for the rising
generation due to implied control by feelings of guilt (Kogan,
2007). Hence, these families may be considered as “apparently
normal” (Öztürk and S¸ar, 2005) which, in fact, comprise of
members with traumatic antecedents, affect dysregulation, and
disturbed communications.
Both the experience and expression of traumatic stress may
be influenced by sex and gender. The latter is heavily shaped by
culture. A recent study documented examples of these differences
as observed in variability of reaction types of traumatic stress
among male and female Yazidi refugees with PTSD in Turkey
(Tekin et al., 2016). Both genders had been exposed to war-
related trauma. Women reported flashbacks, hypervigilance,
and intense psychological distress due to reminders of trauma
(undermodulation of emotions) more frequently than men.
On the other hand, men reported feelings of detachment or
estrangement from others (overmodulation of emotions) more
frequently than women. More depressive women than men
reported feelings of guilt or worthlessness. It is not yet known
whether such differences between women and men are based on
gender (socio-culturally formed roles) or sex (biologically formed
differences).
The shape and functions of crisis episodes superimposed on
a trauma-process constitute a further culture-sensitive sphere.
Both the prevalence of non-epileptic seizures as well as acute
dissociative reactions with psychotic symptoms seem to differ
widely in different parts of the world. This points to the strong
cultural aspects of these conditions (S¸ar et al., 2009; Martinez-
Taboas et al., 2010). To a degree unusual for other psychiatric
constructs, cultural sensitivity in experience, and/or assessment
of dissociative disorders (S¸ar, 2006; Lewis-Fernandez et al., 2007)
is represented even in differences between the official diagnostic
manuals of psychiatric disorders such as the DSM-5 (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013) and the ICD-10 (World Health
Organization, 1992). While the DSM-5 is more sensitive in
describing chronic cognitive-emotional dissociation, the ICD-10
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is focused on acute and sensori-motor dissociation. Both
systems ignore the acute dissociative reaction with psychotic
features. Such oversight impedes better understanding of the
relationship between crisis conditions and chronic underlying
psychopathological processes. At the same time, this relationship
may illuminate the diverse ways of handling conflicts in the
internal and external world as represented in various cultures.
Social origin of such conditions may exceed that of the individual
and family during a historical period of drastic social change
(Krüger et al., 2007; Hegeman, 2013; Demirbugan, 2016).
BECOMING “ONE-SELF”: OVERCOMING
THE FEAR OF LONELINESS
Dissociation is not a static but a dynamic condition. Individuals
suffering from posttraumatic dissociation do not experience
only discontinuities and/or disruption of their mental functions.
Rather, they experience simultaneously an intense striving to
achieve the normal integration of these to attain the sense
of experience of wholeness (Wilson, 2006; Tagliavini, 2014).
Associations tend to be established between disrupted structures
of the mind which may remain hidden in the eyes of the
observer in the first instance. Integration requires connection,
inside and outside. Paradoxically, distinct or “alter” personality
states in DID do not solely comprise disintegrated structures.
They also represent a striving for re-establishment of the lost
unity (S¸ar and Öztürk, 2005). In fact, psychotraumatology is a
discipline requiring dialectical thinking (Fischer and Riedesser,
1999); i.e., opposites may coexist (S¸ar, 2015a). To this extent,
“alter” personalities in DID also constitute an attempt to bridge
the gap between the detached “sociological” and “psychological”
selves (Öztürk and S¸ar, 2016b).
Traumatic stress is in a relationship with formation as well
as transformations and disturbances of self-identity (Wilson,
2006; Putnam, 2016; S¸ar, in press). Firstly, trauma may affect
memory which influences perception of one’s life (Brewin, 2011).
Mental intrusions (e.g., vivid memories) and omissions (e.g.,
amnesias) may undermine one’s sense of self and agency. What
makes the influence of trauma on self-identity more complex
is that the naturally wired protective response of the human
organism to chronic developmental stress; i.e., the division of
mind to save the unique aspects of the individual. Thus, in effect,
dissociation serves to “safeguard” the potential of regaining the
hidden preserved treasure. The cost of this dividedness is self-
estrangement. Hence, re-claiming one’s authentic self-identity
remains the basicmission of psychotherapy for trauma-generated
conditions.
Given the dual nature of the interplays in, as well as between,
the internal world and external reality, mental integration as
both the means and goal of healing needs to lessen internal and
external fears and re-establish mutuality (Erikson, 1950/1963)
between the internal “world” (psychological “reality”) and
external (sociological) “reality.” This is also while retaining the
boundaries between them (Fonagy et al., 2002). The “Theory of
Functional Dissociation of Self ” (S¸ar and Öztürk, 2007, 2013)
explores and proposes avenues of integration for dividedness of
human consciousness which has outlived its purpose of ad hoc
adjustment to external reality.
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